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We examined the effects of cognitive load on the strategy selection in the forced
choice test (FCT) when used to detect hidden crime knowledge. Examinees
(N = 120) with and without concealed knowledge from a mock crime were subjected
to an FCT either under standard circumstances or cognitive load. Cognitive load was
implemented through time pressure. The FCT distinguished examinees with concealed
knowledge from those without better than chance in both conditions, but the counter-
strategies did not differ between conditions. Further investigation revealed that time
pressure did affect examinees' ability to follow their intended counterstrategy to
produce randomized test patterns, which constitutes an effective counterstrategy in
the FCT. Hence, time pressure lowered the success rate of effective counterstrategies,
but not their incident rates. Further disambiguation of various cognitive load
manipulations and their effects on strategy selection and execution is needed.
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The forced choice test (FCT) can be applied to detect concealed
knowledge about an event (Denney, 1996; Pankratz, 1983). In an
FCT, the examinees are presented with questions about the event,
two possible answer alternatives, and the instruction to select the
correct answer alternatives or to guess in case they do not know.
Although examinees who are unaware of the correct answer have
no choice other than to guess, examinees who try to conceal their
knowledge tend to purposefully select incorrect answers. Therefore,
test scores fall below chance levels—so‐called underperformance—
and can be used as detection criterion (Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve,
2001; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2010).
Empirical research suggests that examinees with concealed
knowledge can successfully be detected at rates varying from 40% to- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van
Bergen, 2004; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007;
Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Orthey, Vrij, Leal, & Blank,
2017; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2014). This detection
accuracy is directly related to the prevalence of three different self‐
reported response patterns that examinees with concealed knowledge
use to avoid being detected by the test (Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey,
Vrij, Meijer, Leal, & Blank, 2018). These response patterns are defined
in terms of hierarchical strategy levels and specify how answer alterna-
tives are selected depending on the examinees' beliefs about the test's
detection mechanism (Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). Exam-
inees using a level 0 strategy form no belief about the test's detection
mechanism and comply with the test instructions to select the correct
answer alternatives. Examinees using a level 1 strategy assume that the- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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response pattern is a reaction to the test instructions. Instead of
selecting the correct answers, examinees select the incorrect answers.
Examinees using a level 2 strategy assume that the test uses a level 1
strategy as detection mechanism and provide a mixture of correct
and incorrect answers as response pattern instead. Although each
strategy level predicts a different behaviour, the intended objective is
the same, namely, to avoid detection by the FCT. In an FCT, levels 1
and 2 are the most prevalent strategy levels with roughly equal
frequencies; level 0 rarely occurs in examinees with concealed
knowledge. Consequently, the underperformance criterion used to
detect concealed knowledge in an FCT is suitable for detecting a level
1 strategy but does not detect examinees using a level 2 strategy.
Therefore, in theory, detection accuracy could be increased by manip-
ulations that shift the participant's strategy from level 2 to level 1.
The three strategy levels were derived from cognitive hierarchy
theory (see Carmerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004). From this theory, it follows
that limitations in cognitive resources affect the strategy selection. As
such, the strategy an examinee selects is not necessarily the optimal
strategy but rather a strategy that is “good enough” given the available
cognitive resources (also known as satisficing; see Simon, 1955). Pre-
vious research indicates that a large proportion of examinees have suf-
ficient cognitive resources available to discern the test's mechanism
and to devise an appropriate counterstrategy (see Orthey et al.,
2017; Orthey et al., 2018). Thus, if one could limit the cognitive
resources available to examinees, this would reduce the frequency of
higher order strategies (e.g., level 2). As a consequence, the detection
accuracy of the FCT would increase, because more examinees would
be forced to employ a level 1 strategy instead.
It is generally accepted that humans have a limited amount of cog-
nitive resources available at any given moment. Therefore, increasing
the overall cognitive load limits the available resources that can be
allocated (Plass, Moreno, & Brunken, 2010). We chose to implement
cognitive load through time pressure, as it is a commonly used
manipulation for cognitive load (see Klapproth, 2008) and it can easily
be introduced into the FCT paradigm. Hence, we subjected examinees
to a mock crime procedure or a filler task followed by either a standard
FCT or an FCT with the restriction that each question had to be
answered within 2 s. We tested two hypotheses: Under time pressure,
examinees will be more likely to report using lower level strategies
(e.g., level 1 instead of level 2, or level 0 instead of level 1) than under
standard conditions (Hypothesis 1). As a consequence, examinees with
concealed knowledge will display more extreme (positive or negative)
test scores, resulting in increased classification accuracy of the FCT
(Hypothesis 2).1Because of restriction imposed by our ethical committee, we were not allowed to ask partic-
ipants to imagine that they were terrorists. We therefore chose this compromise.2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
We tested 120 examinees (33 males and 87 females) from a university
undergraduate population. Their mean age was M = 24.61 (SD = 7.31).The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of the Science
Faculty of the University of Portsmouth, and examinees received
course credit for participating in the experiment.2.2 | Procedure
Examinees were randomly assigned to one of two virtual reality sce-
narios. In both scenarios, examinees were placed in a virtual apartment
that could be freely explored from the first‐person perspective. In the
concealed knowledge conditions, examinees were told that they were
to investigate the apartment of a terrorist and had to obtain and
remember as much information as possible about the terrorist and
his planned actions. The apartment contained clues that could be
investigated further. These clues were easily visible. Examinees could
examine them further by clicking on them. This provided them with
a more detailed picture and short description of the clue. Once all
clues were examined, the simulation terminated and examinees were
instructed not to reveal the knowledge gained from the simulation
for the remainder of the experiment.1 In the no concealed knowledge
condition, examinees were instructed to survey a different apartment
and instructed to remember as much detail as possible. This simulation
terminated after 3 minutes.
Then all examinees were subjected to an FCT examination about
the terrorist apartment. The test was computerized, and examinees
were randomly assigned to either the standard or time pressure condi-
tion. In the standard conditions, examinees received 20 questions
about the terrorist apartment, each of which featured two possible
answer alternatives. Questions were presented in two steps. First,
the question was displayed in the centre of the screen. Upon clicking
the “next” button at the bottom centre of the screen, the question dis-
appeared and the two answer alternatives were presented at the top
left/right side. All answer alternatives were pictures, and examinees
could select an answer by clicking on it with a mouse button. Exam-
inees received the following instructions: “Next, you will be presented
with a number of questions and two answer alternatives per question.
Select the correct answer. If you don't know, guess.” Examinees in the
time pressure condition received the additional instruction: “You have
to choose an answer alternative for each question within two seconds,
otherwise the trial will time‐out. If you time‐out too often, you fail the
test automatically.” In case an examinee took longer than 2 s, a buzzer
sound occurred to signal the time out. The number of time outs had no
consequences for the rest of the experiment.
After the FCT procedure, examinees were instructed that the
deception detection task was over and that they should answer the
following questions honestly. To measure the response strategies
used during the FCT, examinees were asked: “What did you do to
avoid being classified as a liar by the previous test?” Their answers
were recorded, transcribed, and coded by two independent coders
(90.00% absolute agreement).
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questions and answer alternatives again and were tasked to indicate
the correct answer alternative they remembered from the simulation.
This served as a memory check, and memory performance was good
(91.17%).2.3 | Materials
We used the same virtual reality simulations, FCT questions, and
answer alternatives as in Orthey et al. (2018). The answer alternatives
of all questions were validated to be equally plausible (see Doob &
Kirschenbaum, 1973). Orthey et al. (2018) validated the questions
and answer alternatives by asking examinees who were unaware of
the correct answers to indicate the most plausible answer. Any
questions in which one answer alternative was selected by 70% or
more of the sample were deemed biased and removed. In total, the
FCT contained 20 questions with two answer alternatives each.
Answer alternatives were presented pictorially and had the same size.
To control for order effects, the sequence of questions was
counterbalanced across examinees, using a Latin square of the size
20. Therefore, the 20 questions occurred equally often over all
possible trials (1–20). The horizontal alignment of the correct answer
alternative was determined randomly on each trial.2We also differentiated for the factor veracity. A 2 Veracity (concealed knowledge vs. no
concealed knowledge) × 2 Cognitive load (standard vs. time pressure) between‐subjects anal-
ysis of variance with average reaction time as dependent variable was conducted. We found a
significant difference for Veracity, F (1, 116) = 18.91, p < .001, η2 = .14. Examinees without
concealed knowledge (M = 4.99, SD = 4.58) took longer than those with concealed knowledge
(M = 2.92, SD = 2.43). We also found a significant effect for cognitive load, F (1,
116) = 108.92, p < .001, η2 = .48. Examinees in the standard condition (M = 6.43, SD = 3.99)
took longer than examinees in the time pressure condition (M = 1.48, SD = 0.81). There was
also a significant Veracity × Cognitive load interaction, F (1, 116) = 11.11, p = .001, η2 = .09.
The difference between examinees with and without concealed knowledge was larger in the
standard condition (concealed knowledge: M = 4.61, SD = 2.47; no concealed knowledge:
M = 8.25, SD = 4.42) than in the time pressure condition (concealed knowledge: M = 1.25,
SD = 0.22; no concealed knowledge: M = 1.73, SD = 1.09), F (1, 116) = 29.51, p < .001.2.4 | Design
This experiment featured a 2 Veracity (concealed knowledge vs. no
concealed knowledge) × 2 Cognitive load (standard vs. time pres-
sure) between‐subjects design with the test scores as dependent
variable. Test scores were computed by submitting the raw total
number of correct answer alternatives selected to a z transformation
according to the binomial distribution (see Siegel & Castellan, 1988,
p. 43). The higher/lower a z score was, the less likely it was to occur
due to chance. Underperformance was defined as test scores below
chance performance. Detection accuracy was estimated using the
area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic
(see Tanner & Swets, 1954; Hanley & McNeil, 1982). A receiver
operating characteristic plots the sensitivity (detection rate of exam-
inees with concealed knowledge) against the false positive rate
(incorrect classifications of examinees without concealed knowledge)
for each possible cut‐off. The AUC indicates the general diagnostic
value for all possible cut‐offs. An AUC ranges from 0 to 1, and 0.5
refers to chance performance. AUCs larger than 0.5 suggest that
the criterion detects the signal better than chance. Examinees' test
scores were used to postdict examinees' true group membership
(concealed knowledge/no concealed knowledge). Lower scores were
treated as indicative of concealed knowledge. For comparison with
previous articles, we also report sensitivity and specificity (detection
rate of examinees with and without concealed knowledge). For this
analysis, examinees with a z score smaller than −1.65 were classified
as having concealed information (see also Meijer et al., 2007;
Verschuere, Meijer, & Crombez, 2008). For further exploration, wecategorized FCT z scores into below, above, and within
chance performance as predicted by the three strategy levels. We
used thetraditional 5% cut‐off (bidirectional; z scores larger than
1.96 for above chance performance, or lower than −1.96 for below
chance performance) for classification.
Examinees' responses to the open‐ended question were coded
into distinct strategy levels (0, 1, and 2; see Orthey et al., 2017;
Orthey et al., 2018). These strategy levels define the self‐reported
selection strategy of the examinee based on their belief over the tests'
detection mechanism. A level 0 strategy assumes that no belief over
the detection mechanism are formed and examinees comply with
the test instructions to select the correct answer alternatives. Hence,
a level 0 strategy would result in performance above chance. A level
1 strategy operates on the belief that the test identifies concealed
knowledge through compliance with the test instructions and there-
fore, features a reaction to them, such as picking the incorrect answers
instead. Employing a level 1 strategy would result in performance
below chance. Finally, a level 2 strategy is derived from
the understanding that the test detects concealed knowledge through
underperformance. Consequently, a level 2 strategy features
behaviours with the goal to provide a mixture of correct and incorrect
answers, resulting in test scores that fall within chance performance.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Reaction time
To test whether our time pressure manipulation was effective, we
conducted a Welch's t test for the time pressure condition with
average reaction time as dependent variable. We found a significant
difference between the standard and time pressure conditions,
t(63.93) = 9.38, p < .001. Examinees in the time pressure condition
(M = 1.48s, SD = 0.81) responded faster than examinees in the stan-
dard condition (M = 6.43s, SD = 3.99).2 Furthermore, we looked into
the number of times participants timed out (i.e., a response time longer
than 2 s). In the time pressure condition, examinees with and without
concealed knowledge differed significantly in the number of times the
time limit was exceeded, t(58) = 3.59, p < .001, examinees with
concealed knowledge timed out on average 1.03 (SD = 0.99) times,
and examinees without concealed knowledge timed out on average
4.07 (SD = 4.52) times. In sum, we conclude that our time pressure
TABLE 2 Examinees' total scores categorized into below, above, and
within chance performance
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outs.Condition
Below chance
performance
Within chance
performance
Above chance
performance N
Level 0
Standard 1 0 4 5
Time pressure 1 0 2 3
Level 1
Standard 13 0 0 13
Time pressure 14 2 2 18
Level 2
Standard 1 8 0 9
Time pressure 4 3 1 8
Note. Frequencies are differentiated per strategy level for examinees with3.2 | Response strategies
First, we examined the self‐reported strategy levels of examinees with
concealed knowledge. In both the standard and time pressure
conditions, level 1 strategies were the most prevalent (standard = 48%;
time pressure = 62%) followed by level 2 strategies (standard = 33%;
time pressure = 28%) and level 0 strategies (standard = 19%; time
pressure = 10%). A chi‐square test of independence was calculated
comparing the frequency of the strategy levels between the standard
and time pressure conditions. We found that the frequency of the
different strategy levels did not differ between conditions,
Χ2(2,N= 56) = 1.30, p= .523. These results do not supportHypothesis 1.
concealed knowledge. Scores were categorized as follows: below chance
performance: x ≤ −1.96; above chance performance: x ≥ 1.96; and within
chance performance: −1.96 < x < 1.96. Examinees that could not be cate-
gorized in any of these strategy levels were excluded. This led to three
exclusions in the standard condition and one in the time pressure
condition.3.3 | Test scores
The test scores detected concealed knowledge better than chance in
both the standard and time pressure conditions (see Table 1). To
further assess the effects of time pressure on the test scores, we
compared examinees with concealed knowledge between conditions
per strategy levels. First, we categorized the test scores into perfor-
mance below, above, and within chance levels. Table 2 displays fre-
quency of test outcomes per condition and within each self‐reported
strategy level. For level 0 and 1 strategies, the distributions of test
scores were similar. For the examinees using level 2 strategies, in the
standard condition, 89% fell within chance performance and only
11% fell below chance performance. In the time pressure condition,
only 37.5% fell within chance performance with 50% displaying below
chance level performance. Time pressure seemed to affect only exam-
inees who reported to randomize between correct and incorrect
answers, so we tested whether scores outside chance performance
(below and above chance performance combined) were more likely
to occur under time pressure for level 2 strategies. A chi‐square test
revealed a significant effect, Χ2(1) = 4.90, p = .027; test scores outside
chance performance occurred more frequently under time pressure.
Additionally, we conducted an independent samples t test on the
absolute test scores, because not all assumptions of the chi‐square
test were met. Examinees who reported a level 2 strategy had higher
test scores in the time pressure condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.62), thanTABLE 1 Detection accuracy of total scores per condition
Condition
Sensitivity
(%)
Specificity
(%) AUC p 95% CI
Test scores
Standard 50.00 97.77 0.66 .034 [.50, .82]
Time pressure 66.66 93.33 0.80 <.001 [.67, .93]
Note. Sensitivity and specificity were calculated using the traditional 5%
cut‐off (z < −1.65). AUC denotes area under the curve, and 95% confi-
dence intervals (CIs) are reported.in the standard condition (M = 0.77, SD = 0.69), t(15) = −3.50, p = .003.
This effect was strong (Cohen's d = 1.72). Altogether, this supports our
second hypothesis that test scores become more extreme under time
pressure although only for examinees who reported to use a level 2
strategy.4 | DISCUSSION
We subjected examinees with and without concealed knowledge to a
standard FCT or a modified FCT that forced examinees to respond
within 2 s for each question. We introduced time pressure to the
FCT paradigm to elicit cognitive load, which we expected would lead
examinees with concealed knowledge to be more likely to select
lower level strategies and hence, increase the detection accuracy of
the FCT.
We found no evidence that time pressure affects strategy selec-
tion. Although participants in the time pressure condition responded
faster, examinees did not differ in the frequencies of self‐reported
response strategies, and these frequencies matched those found in
other experiments (see Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). Yet
further exploration suggests that time pressure did lead to signifi-
cantly more extreme test scores in examinees with concealed
knowledge who reported using level 2 strategies. When categorized
into below, above, and within chance performance, more than half
of those examinees fell outside the chance performance category,
and only a minority managed to achieve chance performance (around
37%). This stands in sharp contrast with findings in our control condi-
tion and previous research (see Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al.,
2018), where most examinees who reported to have randomized their
answers achieved test scores that fall within chance performance.
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inees with concealed knowledge reported to have used, it did affect
their ability to successfully execute these strategies. These findings
have important implications for increasing the detection accuracy of
the FCT. Time pressure is easy to implement into an FCT procedure
and could be especially useful when the prevalence of randomization
behaviour is high. This could, for example, be the case when exam-
inees have informed themselves about the rationale underlying the
test by reading articles, coached by an attorney, or after repeated
testing (for the effects of coaching on the FCT, see Verschuere
et al., 2008).
In terms of overall detection accuracy, both the traditional FCT
and the time pressure FCT detected concealed knowledge better
than chance. The standard condition had a detection accuracy close
to AUC = 0.70, which is within the range of previous research (Meijer
et al., 2007; Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). By comparison,
the time pressure condition featured one of the best
detection accuracies found so far, around AUC = 0.80. A likely reason
for this is the reduced success rate of level 2 strategies, resulting in
more extreme test scores that are detected by the underperformance
criterion. This implies that detection accuracy could additionally be
increased by making effective counterstrategies harder to perform
successfully.
From a theoretical point of view, these findings suggest that strat-
egy selection is not the only component affecting the test score. In
addition, examinees' ability to successfully execute their intended
strategy plays a role. In this case, time pressure led examinees who
reported using a level 2 strategy to produce more extreme test scores
than those not under time pressure. Other, lower level strategies were
not affected, likely because they are easier to execute (i.e., either
selecting only correct or only incorrect answers). That means the influ-
ence of cognitive load must be differentiated in terms of affecting
strategy selection or strategy execution. Further disambiguation
between strategy selection, the intended test outcome, and strategy
execution, the actual test outcome, is needed, especially in light of
various implementations of cognitive load.
Future research on the strategy selection could focus more on
making it harder to discern the test's detection mechanism through
misdirection (see Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014). For
example, Orthey et al. (2017) added a fake polygraph to the set‐up
of the FCT procedure in order to make examinees believe their phys-
iological responses were recorded during the test. As a consequence,
more examinees complied with the test instructions to select the
correct answer alternatives (lowest level strategy) with the polygraph
set‐up than in the control group. In a similar manner, other, more
salient forms of misdirection could be used to shape examinees'
strategy selection process.
In sum, although we found no evidence that time pressure affects
the strategy selection of examinees with concealed knowledge, it did
affect the execution of their self‐reported strategy, resulting in lower
success rates of level 2 strategies. As such, time pressure provides
an easy to implement adjustment to the FCT that will likely increase
its detection accuracy.CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
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